Archive for the ‘Title VII’ Category

Ricci v. DeStefano: Putting Employers Between a Rock and a Hard Place

Thursday, July 2nd, 2009

By R. Joseph Leibovich
Shuttleworth Williams, PLLC
(901) 328-8269
jleibovich@shuttleworthwilliams.com

The United States Supreme Court has put employers in spot where they may not be able to tell which way to go if they want to avoid Title VII litigation.

I. The Case

On June 29, 2009, in Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court reversed a decision from the Second Circuit (which, interestingly, Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor heard as part of a panel).

At issue in Ricci were tests administered by the city of New Haven, Connecticut, to determine which members of the fire department are eligible for lieutenant and captains positions. In 2003, 118 New Haven firefighters took the qualifying examinations. The passage rate for White applicants was significantly higher than it was for Black and Hispanic applicants.

Following heated discussions, the city threw out the tests for fear of facing a disparate-impact race discrimination claim. Some of the White applicants who passed the test sued, and the district court granted the city summary judgment. The Second Circuit affirmed.

The Supreme Court, however, took a different view.

Initially, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not contain a “disparate-impact” cause of action. That is, it only addressed intentional discrimination based on race, among other factors. However, the United States Supreme Court in cases such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1972) and Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) recognized a cause of action for disparate-impact claims, in which a facially neutral practice is discriminatory in effect. Employers could defend such practices by showing that the practice is job-related. In such cases a plaintiff would then have to show legitimate alternatives to the practice that had less of a discriminatory impact.

As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified these concepts.

In the Ricci case, the city of New Haven faced a real dilemma. There was no question that test did have a disparate impact on minority candidates. This ultimately led the city to decide to throw out the test results. However, in doing this, the City actively discriminated against White applicants who had successfully taken an objective test. So, the City appeared to be in a position of avoiding either intentional discrimination against the White employees, or of avoiding unintentional discrimination of the minority candidates.

The United States Supreme Court held that the City’s decision violated Title VII.

The Court noted that there is an apparent conflict in Title VII’s intentional discrimination and disparate-impact provisions. And, the Court set out to try and provide guidance in how to deal with such conflicts. The Court adopted a “strong-basis-in-evidence” standard. Under this standard, an employer can only make race-based decisions in cases where “there is a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability, buit it is not so restrictive that it allows employers to act only when there is a provable, actual violation.”

In Ricci, the Court determined the City did not have a strong-basis-in-evidence to believe that it would face liability under a disparate-impact claim. The Court acknowledged that there was a prima facie claim of disparate-impact based on the passing percentage of minority applicants. However, the Court concluded that although a prima facie case could have existed, the City could not show a strong basis to show it would have ultimately been liable for such claims as it appears that the tests likely would have been deemed to be consistent with job necessity, and it appears that there likely were not less-discriminatory methods than the tests that would have served the City’s needs.

Therefore, the Court held the White firefighters were entitled to summary judgment on their Title VII claim for intentional discrimination. Based on this, the Court decided it need not address the issue of whether or not the City’s actions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. And, interestingly, the Court noted that it specifically did not hold that the very standard it announced would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. This remains a very open issue.

II. What Does This Mean To Employers?

Ricci may well put employers in a quandry. Employers who utilize objective test or application standards that have a disparate-impact on minority applicants now can not simply err on the side of caution and boot the results of those standards. An employer that finds itself in this position must now go through a legal analysis and, essentially, determine how it would fight and either win or lose a disparate-impact claim before deciding if it can ignore the results of the facially neutral standards. But, either way an employer decides in these cases, there is a real risk of litigation.

Of course, the best plan of action is to try to make standards as “bullet proof” as possible. Make sure employment or promotion testing or standards are absolutely necessary for the position. Analyze whether or not such standards are likely to have a disparate-impact, and, if so, determine whether or not there are other ways to reach the same goals that likely have less of a potentially discriminatory impact.

This is, admittedly, easy to say on paper. Sometimes it is impossible to know for sure what may or may not have a disparate-impact that favors one protected group over another. So, when the spectre of disparate-impact discrimination appears after standards have been applied, employers need to take a step back and really balance out the potential dangers of a disparate-impact claim on one hand and an intentional discrimination claim on the other. If the employer does not have a strong basis – based on the facts of the case – that it would lose a disparate-impact claim, then that employer would be facing real danger in erring on the side of avoiding the disparate-impact liability and in taking action that amounts to intentional discrimination against the protected group that was not adversely affected by the standards in question.

Unfortunately, Ricci will likely lead to employer confusion and make it difficult to decide which way to move. This is one of those situations where an employer simply has to make an educated guess as to which path is less dangerous. And, of course, that provides employers little comfort. It puts employers in the position of essentially having to figure out how they would fare in a non-existent lawsuit before deciding which way to lean in a conflict inherent in Title VII. But, being able to legally analyze these issues should at least help employers head in the right direction, which is why this is an area where consultation with an attorney prior to making a decision could be invaluable.

The articles published in this blog are for informational purposes only, and are not intended to be legal advice or a solicitation for legal services. For specific legal questions and issues, you should contact an attorney of your choice.

The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act: Paycheck Discrimination Claims Get A Longer Life

Wednesday, March 18th, 2009

By R. Joseph Leibovich
Shuttleworth Williams, PLLC
(901) 328-8269
jleibovich@shuttleworthwilliams.com

The first bill President Obama signed into law shortly after taking office was the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. The law was specifically designed to nullify a Supreme Court decision, and to extend the reach of potential claims regarding disparate pay discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act.

History

The legislation was triggered by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). Lilly Ledbetter (“Ledbetter”) worked at a manufacturing facility as a salaried employee from 1979 through 1998. In March 1998 she filed a charge with the EEOC alleging discrimination based on her gender. After retiring in November 1998, Ledbetter filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Ultimately, she filed a lawsuit under Title VII and under the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”). The EPA claim was dismissed by the trial court, while the Title VII claim went forward.

Ledbetter alleged that decisions regarding pay were based on supervisor evaluations, and that during the course of her employment, she was given negative evaluations due to her gender. The jury awarded her backpay and damages.

The case went through the appellate process, and ended up at the United States Supreme Court. The issue before the Court involved a statutory requirement for claims under Title VII. Specifically, Title VII requires that before a plaintiff may file a case in court, that individual must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The individual must file that charge within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act (or, in states such as Tennessee where there is also a state law protecting the same rights, the filing period is extended to 300 days).

In Ledbetter’s case, the negative evaluations in question took place more than 180 days before she filed her charge.

The issue was whether or not a new 180 day period commenced with each paycheck, or whether the evaluations represented “discrete acts” of discrimination from which the 180 day began to run.

The Ledbetter Court held that the pay system, which was based on supervisor recommendations, was not established for discriminatory purposes. Therefore, the Court reasoned that the supervisors’ recommendations stood as discrete acts. Since these acts occurred more than 180 days prior to the charge, the Court ruled that Ledbetter’s claim was not timely.

The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009

This decision, along with a strongly worded dissent by Justice Ginsburg, set legislative wheels in motion. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was initially shot down in the Senate in 2008, but was re-introduced, and ultimately passed the House and Senate in January 2009 as The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. President Obama signed the bill into law days after that.

The law explicitly legislatively reverses the Ledbetter decision. Under the law, each paycheck triggers a new 180 (or 300) day period within which to file a charge of discrimination when the amount of the paycheck is affected by a discriminatory reason. This is a reintroduction of the “paycheck accrual rule” that the EEOC and most federal courts of appeals had applied prior to the Ledbetter decision.

The law does not only apply to discrimination based on gender. It applies to all categories protected by Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA and the Rehabilitation Act.

Under the Act, back pay of up to two years is recoverable where the acts earlier than 180 (or 300) days prior to the charge are similar or related to the acts within the statutory period.

The Act was enacted so as to retroactively apply to May 28, 2007 forward.

It is important to note that this law does not affect the Equal Pay Act, which is separate from Title VII. The EPA does not require the filing of an EEOC charge. In Ledbetter, the plaintiff’s EPA claim had been dismissed on summary judgment and she did not pursue that issue in appeals.


What Does This Mean to Employers?

The Act gives Title VII claims a significantly longer shelf life. Actions from the distant past can continue to haunt employers for as long as an individual draws a paycheck. In an effort to potentially limit liability, employers should look at how compensation decisions have been made. Where there has been subjectivity that could have been influenced by discriminatory intent, employers should consider make sure individuals’ compensation is not inequitable or influenced by discrimination. By fixing past mistakes now, employers can possibly break the links of the chain 180 (or 300) days after the appropriate changes are made.

The articles published in this blog are for informational purposes only, and are not intended to be legal advice or a solicitation for legal services. For specific legal questions and issues, you should contact an attorney of your choice.